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urely one of the most widely cited book reviews in the American legal 
academy is Morton Horwitz’s review in the Yale Law Journal of E. P. 
Thompson’s Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act and 
Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, 
coauthored by Thompson.3 As of summer 2008, this six-page review had 
been cited 132 times.4 This is quite a tribute to a brief book review that was 
published more than three decades ago.5  
 Horwitz’s review is famous for criticizing Thompson’s statement, at 
the conclusion of Whigs and Hunters, that the rule of law is “an unqualified 
human good.”6 Horwitz’s criticism is important as a key statement within the 
critical legal studies movement in its first decade,7 along with a skeptical 
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essay on rights published around the same time.8 It is also important for its 
take on Marxist debates about the rule of law, in which Thompson’s book 
was an important event. Interestingly enough, Horwitz is critical of 
Thompson for engaging in too much “reductionism” that simply “expose[s] 
the mystifying functions of the law and [strips] away its claim to class 
neutrality.”9 His complaint is that legal historians, including Thompson, 
must do more than simply “pile on evidence of the hypocritical character” of 
claims by partisans of “the rule of law” to its “political neutrality.”10 Even a 
radical legal historian, therefore, should be willing, indeed eager, to note the 
extent to which on occasion recourse to the law can indeed lead to the 
protection of the vulnerable and downtrodden against those with far more 
power and social status. Thus, Horwitz notes (and praises) some 
“extraordinary passages” in which Thompson “brilliantly elaborates the neo-
Marxist conception of legal ideology as an autonomous instrument of social 
control,”11 which means, among other things, that law, to be effective, must 
“seem to be just” and go beyond the “exclusive” service of the ruling class.12 
Thus Horwitz in no way scoffs at legal arguments and the possibility that 
they might in fact, at least on occasion, do genuine good with regard to 
serving the interests of the vulnerable and the downtrodden. 
 Still, even as he praises Thompson for showing how law can appear 
to be just and beneficial to subordinate groups, Horwitz nevertheless 
criticizes (and gains citational fame regarding) what he calls a “surprising 
and disturbing” turn in the argument: Thompson criticizes those “modern 
Marxists” who have ostensibly “overlooked [the fact] that there is a 
difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law.” Although 
Thompson endorses the necessity of exposing “the shams and inequities 
which may be concealed beneath the law,” he goes on immediately to add 
that “the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power 
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(1984): 391–411.  
8 Morton J. Horwitz, “Rights,” Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law 
Review 23 (1988): 393–406. 
9 Horwitz, “The Rule of Law,” 565.  
10 Ibid., 566.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid., quoting Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 263–65.  
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and the defence of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claim, seem to be 
an unqualified human good. To deny or belittle this good is, in this 
dangerous century when the resources and pretensions of power continue to 
enlarge, a desperate error of intellectual abstraction.”13 
Horwitz famously responded that “I do not see how a Man of the 
Left can describe the rule of law as ‘an unqualified human good.’”14 He 
conceded that law “undoubtedly restrains power.” Yet, speaking as a child of 
the New Deal and American legal realism, Horwitz argued that “it also 
prevents power’s benevolent exercise.” Law might “create formal equality—
a not inconsiderable virtue—but it promotes substantive inequality by 
creating a consciousness that radically separates law from politics, means 
from ends, processes from outcomes.” The promotion of procedural justice 
by devotees of the rule of law “enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the 
wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage,” not to mention 
“ratif[ying] and legitimat[ing] an adversarial, competitive, and atomistic 
conception of human relations.”15 “[W]e should never forget,” Horwitz 
states in his concluding paragraph, that “a ‘legalist’ consciousness that 
excludes ‘result-oriented’ jurisprudence as contrary to the rule of law also 
inevitably discourages the pursuit of substantive justice.” Law is an 
“unqualified human good” “[o]nly if Hitler, Stalin, and all of the other 
horrors of this century have forced us finally to accept the Hobbesian vision 
of the state and human nature. . . .”16 That vision, of course, poses the 
Leviathan state, with an all-powerful sovereign ruler, as the only way of 
overcoming the disaster of the state of nature, which offers the promise only 
of lives that are “nasty, brutish, and short.”17 The implicit argument is that 
the more optimistic John Locke is a better guide than the dour and fearful 
Hobbes.  
 Horwitz’s implicit preference for Locke over Hobbes might have 
brought some rueful pleasure to his thesis adviser, Louis Hartz, famous for 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 655, quoting Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 266.  
14 Ibid., 566. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (1651; Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1960), 82. 
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asserting Locke’s dominant role in American liberal thought.18 But 
Horwitz’s rejection of law as “an unqualified human good” also echoes 
another dominant presence in the Harvard government department during 
Horwitz’s (and Levinson’s) presence there as graduate students: Judith 
Shklar. In some ways a critical legal theorist avant le lettre, Shklar’s 1964 
book Legalism emphasized the centrality of Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
observation: “If [lawyers] prize freedom much, they generally value legality 
still more: they are less afraid of tyranny, than of arbitrary power.”19 She 
noted that “the main thrust of legalist ideology is toward orderliness, and 
formalism can readily reinforce an inherent preference for authority. . . . It 
cannot be repeated often enough that procedurally ‘correct’ repression is 
perfectly compatible with legalism.”20 Only a conception of “law” conjoined 
with justice—so that one could confidently assert that an unjust law is not 
law at all—can escape this critique, and Shklar argued that modern legal 
culture had relentlessly separated law, as an analytical concept, from morals 
(or justice). She made no effort to undo that separation, only to emphasize its 
intellectual consequences. 
 Shklar’s point was that the relationship between law—or the rule of 
law—and justice is inevitably contingent. Likewise, Horwitz’s debate with 
Thompson largely boils down to his rejection of Thompson’s claim that the 
rule of law is an unqualified human good. Thompson insisted that whether or 
not law produced injustice in any individual case (or class of cases), a 
system of law as a whole promoted a more just and humane civilization. It 
helped to restrain arbitrary power because the power of the strong, mediated 
“through the forms of law, is something quite distinct from the exercise of 
unmediated force.”21 Moreover, even if a subordinating hegemon regularly 
used law as an ideological mask, this use simultaneously required the 
hegemon to justify itself and hold itself accountable through law.22 “[T]he 
inhibitions upon power imposed by law,” Thompson wrote, “seem to me a 
                                                 
18 See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1955). 
19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley (New 
York: Knopf, 1951), 1:275, quoted in Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), 15. 
20 Shklar, Legalism, 16–17.  
21 Ibid., 266. 
22 Ibid.  
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legacy as substantial as any handed down from the struggles of the 
seventeenth century to the eighteenth, and a true and important cultural 
achievement. . . .”23 Horwitz’s view, by contrast, is that we can never regard 
a legal system as unqualifiedly a good thing. The rule of law might 
sometimes advance justice, but just as often it will mask and justify what we 
should recognize as oppression. Everything depends on the circumstances 
and the historical context. 
Perhaps this helps to explain why Horwitz (like Levinson) was one 
of the hundreds of signatories of an advertisement that appeared in the 
January 13, 2001, New York Times that protested, “[a]s teachers whose lives 
have been dedicated to the rule of law,” against the Supreme Court’s 
egregious decision in Bush v. Gore.24 “By stopping the vote count in Florida, 
the United States Supreme Court used its power to act as political partisans, 
not just judges of a court of law. . . . [W]hen a bare majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court halted the recount of ballots under Florida law, the five 
justices were acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, not as 
judges.”25  
Levinson, though, almost immediately expressed ambivalence about 
signing the ad: he doubts that his life can easily, if at all, be described as 
“dedicated to the rule of law.” This suggests a far greater measure of “faith” 
in the rule of law than he possesses.26 At the very least, he has spent much of 
his own career teaching his students the importance of analytically 
separating law from political morality or justice, perhaps because he has 
emphasized in his own constitutional law courses (and casebook) the place 
of chattel slavery within American law.27 And, given his origins as a 
                                                 
23 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 265. 
24 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
25 See Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “Legal Historicism and Legal 
Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore,” 
Georgetown Law Journal 90 (2001): 188 n. 62. Levinson’s doubts as to his 
own signing of the ad can be found at ibid., 195–96.  
26 See DeGirolami, “Faith in the Rule of Law.”  
27 See Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, Jack M. Balkin, Akhil Reed Amar, and 
Reva B. Siegel, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and 
Materials, 5th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2006); Jack M. Balkin and Sanford 
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political scientist, he is uncertain that one can so radically separate, at least 
without much nuanced discussion, the roles of “political partisans” and 
“judges of a court of law.”28 
Of course, one rarely has much say in the precise wording of political 
advertisements one is asked to sign. One should not draw too much from the 
advertisement about Horwitz’s views on the “essentially contested” notion 
of “the rule of law,”29 or even whether Horwitz considers himself a lifelong 
devotee. But it does raise the question of how Horwitz has treated the idea, 
in light of his criticisms of Thompson, and key events of the early twenty-
first century, beginning, of course, with Bush v. Gore.  
 The rule of law is an important element in both volumes of Horwitz’s 
magisterial work, The Transformation of American Law. The central thesis 
of volume 1 is that during the nineteenth century an “instrumental 
conception” of law replaced the earlier notion that law expressed “the moral 
sense of the community”; instead, law was increasingly recognized as 
“simply reflective of the existing organization of economic and political 
power.”30 A “flexible, instrumental conception of law,” Horwitz argued, 
“was necessary to promote the transformation of the postrevolutionary 
American legal system.”31 This conception, in turn, later gave way to what 
Horwitz called “legal formalism”: a vision of law that attempted “to place 
law under the banner of ‘science’” and therefore “to separate politics from 
                                                                                                                             
Levinson, “Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott,” Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 82 (2007): 49–95. 
28 See, for further discussion and elaboration of the difference between an 
inescapable “high politics” and a perhaps more escapable “low politics,” 
Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution,” University of Virginia Law Review 87 (2001): 1045–104. 
29 An unusually fine overview of the various conceptions attached to the 
notion of the rule of law can be found in Richard H. Fallon Jr., “‘The Rule of 
Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,” Columbia Law Review 97 
(1997): 1–56. 
30 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 253. 
31 Ibid., 54. 
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law, subjectivity from objectivity, and laymen’s reasoning from professional 
reasoning.”32 
 Horwitz’s most extended treatment of the rule of law, however, is 
found near the conclusion of volume 2 of Transformation, focusing on the 
years 1870–1960, and in particular, his chapter on “Legal Realism, the 
Bureaucratic State, and the Rule of Law.”33 It might equally have been titled 
“The Harvard Law School Confronts Legal Realism, the Bureaucratic State, 
and the Rule of Law”: the chapter focuses almost exclusively on two 
Harvard deans, Roscoe Pound and James M. Landis, and Louis Jaffe, the 
great professor of administrative law at Harvard, with a sidelong glance at 
former Harvard professor Felix Frankfurter. Rereading it some sixteen years 
after its initial 1992 publication, what we find most striking is Horwitz’s 
reticence in offering his own views about what “the rule of law” should 
mean in a post-realist age dominated by the modern bureaucratic state. No 
doubt this is partly because Horwitz is writing as an historian; it is, however, 
also partly because his position on the question is complicated, like that of 
anyone whose views about political concepts are sensitive to shifts in 
historical circumstances.34 
  The chapter begins with an analysis of Landis’s “joyous celebration 
of the virtues of ‘expertness’ in justifying the growth of the administrative 
state.”35 The focus on expertise allowed legal scholars to abandon the 
implausible “delegation theory of administrative law that had legitimated the 
extent of bureaucratic power during the previous fifty years.”36 As critics of 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 257. 
33 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: 
The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
213–46.  
34 Two of the blurbers on the back cover of the initial Harvard University 
Press book did not see Horwitz as agnostic on these issues: Kermit Hall 
praises Horwitz for “so wisely argu[ing that] our failure to learn the hard 
historical lessons that politics shapes law denies our own generation the 
opportunity to make effective moral choices through the law.” Stanley N. 
Katz praises Horwitz’s second volume as “a dramatic story and a tract for 
our times,” suggesting that it contains important normative lessons about law 
as well as a bracing good tale. 
35 Horwitz, Transformation I, 216.  
36 Ibid.  
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the New Deal, not all of them mossbacks, recognized, this required 
acknowledging Congress’s ability to delegate legislative power to 
administrative agencies, which would be left free to do whatever they 
thought best. Even some supporters of the New Deal agreed that Congress 
had engaged in “delegation run riot”37 in the National Recovery 
Administration. Landis could hardly deny the importance of delegation, but 
he wanted to shift the conversation to what he believed really legitimized the 
administrative state: the professional training of bureaucrats themselves. It 
presumably made all the difference in the world to whom the power was 
being delegated, a point overlooked in formalistic discussions about 
Congress’s power to delegate at all. 
  In this, Landis was an apt student of his professor, Felix Frankfurter, 
who had been an early devotee of the so-called Wisconsin idea, according to 
which the disciplined intelligence of the university (and its graduates) would 
be joined with the institutions of the modern (and expanding) state.38 Even in 
1912, Frankfurter was emphasizing to Learned Hand the importance of 
creating “permanent administrative tribunal[s]” because of his faith in the 
reality of disinterested expertise. “[W]e are singularly in need in this country 
of the deliberateness and truthfulness of really scientific expertise.”39  
                                                 
37 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) 
(Cardozo, J., concurring). 
38 See Charles McCarthy, The Wisconsin Idea (New York: Macmillan, 
1912). Frankfurter had supported Teddy Roosevelt in the 1912 presidential 
race in part because Woodrow Wilson had criticized expert commissions in 
favor of more direct rule by ordinary Americans. See Sanford Levinson, 
“The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter,” Stanford Law Review 25 
(1973): 432–33. 
39 Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand, Sept. 23, 1912, quoted in Levinson, 
“The Democratic Faith,” 433. Indeed, he justified to Learned Hand his 
decision to return to Harvard, which had offered him a teaching position, on 
the basis that it would offer an unusually fecund training ground for experts. 
“I have long thought,” he wrote Hand, “that juristically, the Wisconsin idea 
should be nationalized, and that it was up to the Law School to do it.” 
Frankfurter to Hand, June 28, 1913, quoted in ibid. Furthermore, as he wrote 
Herbert Croly, the Harvard Law School gave him a forum for “influencing 
year by year the dominant mind in the legal profession in a country which 
necessarily to such a large degree is governed by the legal profession.” 
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 In the legal universe of James Landis and Felix Frankfurter, to be 
“governed by the legal profession” was not the same thing as submitting to 
the “rule of law,” at least in the traditional sense; Frankfurter’s vision, 
spelled out in a letter to Learned Hand, was that the task of the modern law 
professor was “to help fashion a jurisprudence adequate to our industrial and 
economic needs; in fact, to mediate between sociological economics and 
statesmanship.”40 Social science would assist in this mediation. Frankfurter 
was also taken by Frederick W. Taylor’s teachings regarding scientific 
administration.41 Frankfurter spelled out his ideas in an article in the Bulletin 
of the Taylor Society on “The Manager, the Workman, and the Social 
Scientist.”42 It is “the social scientist . . . who gives his life to the 
disinterested study” of questions facing society. Indeed, in a world of 
conflicting interests, where labor and management will necessarily represent 
their own parochial interests, “[t]he public can be represented only by the 
dedication of the service of the social scientist.”43 The role of the gifted 
lawyer trained in a transformed Harvard Law School would be to design the 
constitutional order of a new administrative state; among other things, this 
new order would free disinterested social scientists to make wise and 
benevolent social policies under the very loose guidance of Congress. 
 Landis was far more than Frankfurter’s epigone, but he shared many 
of the views of his coauthor and former teacher. For Landis, modern 
                                                                                                                             
Frankfurter (“FF”) to Croly, undated, in Learned Hand Papers, box 104, 
folder 2, Harvard Law School Library, quoted in ibid. A 1922 New Republic 
article on “The Public Profession of the Law” declared that “the law, more 
than any other profession, ‘moulds the economic life and the government of 
the country,’ [and] the Bar must be equipped by the quality of its intellectual 
outlook, its humility, its insight and its ideals to guide the country into ways 
which make the good life possible.” “The Public Profession of the Law,” 
New Republic 24 (1922): 354, quoted in Levinson, “The Democratic Faith,” 
435 n. 31. 
40 Frankfurter to Hand, June 28, 1913, quoted in ibid., 433.  
41 See F. W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1911); Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific 
Management in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1964).  
42Harlow M. Person, “The Manager, the Workman, and the Social Scientist,” 
Bulletin of the Taylor Society 3, no.1 (1917): 1–7.  
43 Ibid., quoted in Levinson, “The Democratic Faith,” 434.  
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administrative law represented an opportunity to liberate the well-trained 
experts to serve the public interest relatively unfettered by judicial oversight. 
Part of Landis’s opposition to the judiciary was his faith in expertise; but 
part, no doubt, was based on his well-founded “belief that the men who 
composed our judiciary too often held economic and social opinions 
opposed to the ideas of their time.”44  
 Landis might well have thought that he was carrying on not only 
Frankfurter’s mission but also that of Roscoe Pound, his predecessor as dean 
of Harvard Law School. Pound had, after all, been one of the leading 
academic critics at the turn of the century of “mechanical jurisprudence”45 
and called for its replacement by “sociological jurisprudence.” Yet Pound 
did not share Landis’s embrace of the expert-oriented administrative state. 
Instead, he warned of “the idea of administrative absolutism,” by which “a 
highly centralized administration set up under complete control of the 
executive” would create its own rules free of judicial review.46 Pound in 
effect identified Landis (and Frankfurter?) with “the jurists of Soviet 
Russia,” who scoffed at the very idea of the rule of law.47 Pound derisively 
labeled “as far as possible from what the facts are or are likely to be” the 
vision “of a scientific body of experts pursuing objective scientific 
inquiries.”48 
For Horwitz, Pound’s concerns exemplify his “fear of social change” 
and his return to a “faith in a traditional court-centered rule of law idea.”49 
Even so, Horwitz structures the debate between Landis and Pound as one 
                                                 
44 Horwitz, Transformation I, 215, quoting Landis, The Administrative 
Process (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938), 33–34. Although 
Landis was referring to an earlier period of American history, he remained 
skeptical of a judiciary still dominated by adherents of the old order.  
45 Roscoe Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Review 8 
(1908): 605–23. 
46 Horwitz, Transformation I, 220, quoting Roscoe Pound, “Report of the 
Special Committee on Administrative Law,” ABA Annual Report 63 (1938): 
343.  
47 Horwitz, Transformation I, 220, quoting Pound, “Report,” 343. 
48 Horwitz, Transformation I, 220, quoting Pound, “Report,” 344.  
49 Horwitz, Transformation I, 220. 
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between “scientific” and “legalist” approaches to administrative law,50 and 
the narrative arc of the rest of the chapter is the steady movement, at least at 
Harvard, away from Landis’s 1938 exuberance about the possibilities of 
expert administration toward a far greater respect for the virtues of judicial 
oversight and the rule of law. The key legislative event was the passage of 
the quasi-constitutional Administrative Procedures Act, enthusiastically 
embraced by now-Justice Frankfurter. But changes were also occurring in 
the wider culture, signified by Friedrich von Hayek’s ringing attack on the 
modern bureaucratic state in The Road to Serfdom (1944) and a loss of faith 
in the earlier Frankfurter’s vaunted “disinterested expertise.” “After 1946,” 
Horwitz writes, “political attacks on the regulatory state and intellectual 
challenges to social science claims of objectivity marched hand in hand. 
Every triumph of proceduralism occurred at the expense of 
professionalism.”51  
 At this point in Horwitz’s chapter, Louis Jaffe moves to stage center, 
and his story, too, is one of gradual disillusionment with the kinds of claims 
Landis had earlier made. Writing in 1955, Jaffe argued that there exists no 
“autonomy of systems of expert judgment,” and he endorsed Justice 
Jackson’s warning “against the loose application of the concept of 
expertness.”52 Moreover, Horwitz notes that during the 1950s there occurred 
what Balkin has labeled “ideological drift”:53 McCarthy-era oppression, 
some of it involving outrageous uses of administrative power, led to the 
rediscovery of rule-of-law values. “McCarthyism had begun,” writes 
Horwitz, “to undermine the New Dealers’ cavalier attitude toward the rule 
of law in the administrative state.”54 Probably the most important affirmation 
of traditional rule-of-law values on the Left was Charles Reich’s famous 
article “The New Property.”55 In an earlier era, Reich’s arguments for 
procedural protections might well have resonated with conservatives who 
defended property rights as essential to protect individual autonomy against 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 221.  
51 Ibid., 235.  
52 Ibid., 240, quoting Louis Jaffe, “Judicial Review: Question of Law,” 
Harvard Law Review 69 (1955): 277. 
53 Jack M. Balkin, “Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning,” 
Connecticut Law Review 25 (1993): 869–91.  
54 Horwitz, Transformation I, 241 (emphasis added).  
55 Charles Reich, “The New Property,” Yale Law Journal 73 (1964): 733–87. 
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an overweening state. Now, the left was speaking up for the defense of a 
“new” property in government licenses, entitlements, and jobs.  
Through an historical dialectic, the New Deal had produced a welfare 
state, and in a welfare state, the need for procedural guarantees to protect 
welfare entitlements had now become connected to Progressivism. In other 
areas of law, proceduralism promised to protect criminal defendants and 
voters in rotten boroughs. One of the primary “accomplishments” of the 
Progressive Era had been the creation of a regime of juvenile justice. It was 
freed from most traditional legal constraints in the name of “expert” 
intervention in the lives of juveniles who needed help. Now this system was, 
if not dismantled, then at least subjected to harsh critique and the 
reinvocation of rule-of-law limits and procedural rights.56 Indeed, by 1980 
John Hart Ely would offer the canonical defense of judicial review as a 
method of promoting liberal values by protecting process.57 
One can easily infer that Horwitz himself believes that some New 
Dealers went too far—were too “cavalier”—in dismissing notions of the rule 
of law that had been (falsely) viewed as ineluctably linked to the politically 
conservative beliefs of the New Deal critics. But he offers little by way of an 
argument about the optimal role for rule of law in the modern state; he 
certainly does not repudiate his critique of Thompson over a decade earlier. 
He remains attentive to the interplay between wider political views and 
one’s particular attitude toward the rule of law. He ultimately concludes the 
chapter with the following, somewhat cryptic, paragraph: 
<ex>This association of the expansion of welfare rights with widening 
procedural guarantees shattered the traditional Dicean connection between 
conservatism and proceduralism in the administrative state. It is one 
prominent reason why conservatives such as Professor Scalia began to re-
emphasize the distinction between old and new property through resistance 
to expanding procedural guarantees. In the process, conservatives began to 
see what James Landis had always understood—that there has always been a 
                                                 
56 One of Levinson’s first publications was “The Rediscovery of Law,” 
Soundings 57 (1974): 318–37, detailing the rejection of professional 
expertise by many critics and the concomitant embrace of judicial authority. 
57 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
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trade-off between substance and procedure, and that one man’s due process 
[or rule of law] is another man’s delay [and stifling of needed 
innovation].58<ex> 
Horwitz next considered the values behind the rule of law (and, in 
particular, rights discourse) in his admiring study of the Warren Court, aptly 
titled The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice.59 The tone of this book is 
scarcely that of a detached historian. Throughout, Horwitz offers multiple 
reasons why the Warren Court was worthy of admiration. It was “the first to 
attempt to redeem the promises of the Civil War Amendments for black 
citizens.”60 “[F]or the first time, democracy became the foundational value 
in American constitutional discourse.”61 The Warren Court was “the first 
Supreme Court in history to champion the legal position of the underdog and 
the outsider in American society.”62 Finally, “For the first time in American 
history the Supreme Court demonstrated its concern and support for the 
weak and the powerless, the marginal and the socially scorned.”63 
It is worth noting, though, that none of these reasons to admire the 
Warren Court focuses specifically on its fidelity to the rule of law. Indeed, as 
Horwitz explains, “the Warren Court liberals shared a vision of law that the 
Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s had incorporated into New Deal legal 
consciousness.”64 This vision assumed that legal meanings changed with 
varying circumstances, and that, in Justice Brennan’s words, “The genius of 
the Constitution . . . rests . . . in the adaptability of its great principles to cope 
with current problems and current needs.”65 In this progressive vision, law is 
“a malleable instrument of social policy,”66 and it is “impossible not to 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 246. 
59 Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1998). 
60 Ibid., xi. 
61 Ibid., xii. 
62 Ibid., 13. 
63 Ibid., xii. 
64 Ibid., 114. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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incorporate one’s deepest values into constitutional interpretation.”67 The 
Warren Court rejected the Weschlerian fantasy of “neutral principles” 
associated with Justice Frankfurter (and Frankfurterian critics of the Warren 
Court such as Philip Kurland).68 Although Justice Hugo Black clung to the 
fiction of a Constitution whose meaning was fixed and unalterable from the 
time of the founding, even Black “was less dogmatic about changing 
constitutional meanings earlier in his career.”69 
Horwitz’s vision of the Warren Court seems consistent with his view 
of the rule of law as merely a qualified (or contingent) human good. 
However much rights discourse was a favored trope of the Warren Court, 
one should be vigilant against embracing it too easily, since that same 
discourse might, in the wrong hands, be employed to limit human equality 
and violate human dignity. The Warren Court was good because it used law 
not for the benefit of the powerful but for the benefit of the powerless and 
the underdog. Law is beneficial to the extent that it is informed by and 
sustained by the proper values—a value-free application of law in 
controversial situations being, in any case, a phantom. 
Nevertheless, the Warren Court liberals’ vision of law as a flexible 
instrument of social policy conflicted with an earlier Progressive Era (and 
New Deal) assumption that social policy should be articulated primarily by 
the political branches, to which courts would routinely defer. The Warren 
Court, by contrast, made considerable amounts of social policy through 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 115. One should also note in this context Morton J. Horwitz, “The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism,” 
Harvard Law Review 107 (1993): 30–117. He was the first legal historian to 
be selected by the editors of the Harvard Law Review for the signal honor of 
writing the introduction to the annual review of the Supreme Court’s 
handiwork. The major theme of the article is that the American conception 
of the “Constitution as fundamental law” has often entailed the “notion that 
fundamental law is timeless and unchanging,” but this “view . . . cannot be 
reconciled either with twentieth-century constitutional practice or with 
modern theories of law, language and consciousness.” Ibid., 34. Frank 
Michelman’s contribution to this volume explores further some of the 
themes and tensions in Horwitz’s article.  
68 Ibid. On Kurland, see Balkin and Levinson, “Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution,” Virginia Law Review 87 (2001): 1085–90.  
69 Horwitz, “The Constitution of Change,” 114.  
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judicial review: through the incorporation doctrine, through the First 
Amendment, and especially through the equal protection clause. The twin 
notions of law as an instrument of social policy and judicial deference came 
apart during the Warren Court era: the Court’s liberals recognized that they 
could not respect a substantive conception of democracy without holding 
state and local governments to account: for racism, for voting policies that 
effectively limited the suffrage, and for denying basic human rights. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s role during the Warren Court era 
was somewhat different from that of the Roosevelt Court. The Roosevelt 
Court sought to legitimate federal regulation of the economy. The Warren 
Court was tasked with imposing the liberal values of the national political 
coalition on local and regional majorities, particularly in the South. It is 
important to recognize that in the Warren Court era, judicial review was 
largely directed at outliers in the states; although some federal laws were 
indeed invalidated, none was of major importance. Otherwise, as in the case 
of the Roosevelt Court, deference to Congress, and to administrative 
agencies, by and large remained the norm. Exemplary in this regard is the 
O’Brien case, where the Court (by a vote of 7–1) upheld the prosecution of 
Mr. O’Brien for burning his draft card on the fanciful ground that the 
administration of the Selective Service Act would be impeded if persons did 
not have such cards in their possession. And of course, the Warren Court 
was eager to justify the expansion of Congress’s regulatory powers in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, reading the 
commerce clause and the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction 
Amendments generously to expand federal power against states, local 
governments, and private citizens.70 One might also mention in this context a 
far more obscure case, Hannah v. Larch,71 in which Chief Justice Warren, 
over the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas, upheld the practices of the 
Civil Rights Commission even though the commission refused to apply 
conventional due process norms in its investigations of abuses of power by 
southern police officials. The Court happily allowed relatively unfettered 
                                                 
70 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
71 363 U.S. 420 (1960). See Sanford Levinson, “Trials, Commissions, and 
Investigating Committees: The Elusive Search for Norms of Due Process,” 
in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Robert I. 
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, 211–34 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
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trial in the court of public opinion where vindicating the civil rights of 
African Americans was concerned.  
Even though the Warren Court’s activism is overstated, the Supreme 
Court did use its power regularly against state and local governments, 
overturning many prior decisions. In doing so, the majority of that Court 
repeatedly rejected calls for judicial restraint identified with such New 
Dealers as Felix Frankfurter or Robert Jackson (who, of course, had 
famously defined the New Deal as a struggle against “judicial supremacy”). 
Moreover, as noted earlier, part of the Warren Court’s rights revolution, as 
in the famous Gault case,72 explicitly rejected expertise-centered 
justifications for the expansive powers of government officials in the 
juvenile justice system. (A few years later, in the early Burger Court, 
holdovers from the Warren Court would protect procedural rights of welfare 
recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly,73 again rejecting claims of expertise in the 
name of procedural rights.) 
In The Transformation of American Law, Horwitz describes how the 
values of proceduralism and judicial review of administrative action became 
necessary when faith in expertise proved insufficient. In The Warren Court 
and the Pursuit of Justice, Horwitz notes how judicial elaboration of rights 
became necessary to achieve the promises of democracy. In each case, 
progressives came to embrace rule-of-law values and rights discourse—as 
applied by the federal judiciary—to rein in and limit the political branches, 
whether the issue in question was overzealous experts, captured 
administrative agencies, the forces of McCarthyism, or the legacies of Jim 
Crow. 
Yet in these books, Horwitz does not claim that the rule of law itself 
(or rights consciousness) is an unqualified human good. It remains merely an 
instrumental good, valuable to the extent that it produces just results. The 
question begged, however, is to what extent one can be a fair-weather soldier 
and a sunshine patriot for the rule of law and its underlying values. 
That problem arose most clearly at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, first with the disputed election of 2000, which brought George W. 
                                                 
72 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
73 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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Bush to power, and then, even more ominously, with the actual policies of 
the Bush administration. As Jane Mayer demonstrated in her book The Dark 
Side,74 the highest-ranking officials within that administration eagerly 
created a regime of secrecy, domestic surveillance, discretionary detention, 
CIA black sites, and torture, all of them justified by assertions of emergency 
in a potentially endless “war on terror.” Carl Schmitt, though uncited, 
appeared to become the jurisprudential godfather of the Bush 
administration.75 As we have seen, Horwtiz signed a newspaper ad 
denouncing the decision in Bush v. Gore for its failure to live up to the rule 
of law; we have little doubt that he opposed the Bush administration’s 
detention, interrogation, and surveillance regime as well. 
What further complicates matters is that in Bush v. Gore the Supreme 
Court did not simply announce that George W. Bush had won the 
presidency. Rather, it offered a lengthy opinion that looked, at least on the 
surface, like professional legal reasoning based, whether ironically or not, on 
a number of Warren Court precedents involving the importance of equality 
in voting rights. It may have been bad legal reasoning, but that in and of 
itself hardly constitutes a violation of the rule of law, especially given the 
long history of Supreme Court decision making. Many legal decisions—
including some of the seminal decisions of the Warren Court—were 
castigated by eminent academics for the paucity of their legal reasoning, at 
least in conventional terms. Indeed, for several years in the early 1960s, the 
annual forewords of the Harvard Law Review were devoted to angry attacks, 
often by veterans of the New Deal wars, on the shoddiness of the Court’s 
attempts to justify its newfound “activism.” Whatever the rule of law is for 
Horwitz, it can’t be a level of judicial opinion writing that gets unalloyed 
praise from the elite legal academy for meeting the ostensible standards of 
“judicial craft.”76  
                                                 
74 Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror 
Turned into a War on American Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 2008). 
75 See Sanford Levinson, “Torture in Iraq and the Rule of Law in America,” 
Daedalus, Summer 2004, 5–9, reprinted in In the Name of Democracy: 
American War Crimes in Iraq and Beyond, ed. Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler, 
and Brendan Smith, 180–86 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). 
76 For an attack on the “craft” tradition, see Richard Posner, “The Material 
Basis of Jurisprudence” (critique of Herbert Wechsler), in Overcoming Law 
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Similarly, the Bush administration did not claim that it was going 
outside the law or undermining the rule of law in any way. Rather, it was 
equipped with a cadre of bright, ambitious, and talented lawyers who were 
eager to explain, in often mind-numbing detail, why the administration’s 
torture and detention policies were perfectly consistent with international 
and domestic law, or with precedents set by other wartime presidents like 
Abraham Lincoln,77 Woodrow Wilson, or Franklin D. Roosevelt. These 
lawyers, armed with all the tools of contemporary legal culture, were happy, 
as John Yoo was, to argue why what the administration was doing was not 
“real” torture, which required pain equivalent to organ failure, and to 
carefully distinguish waterboarding, which was permissible, from the 
gouging out of eyes or the slicing off of limbs, which was not. But Yoo was 
also quick to explain that even if the administration’s practices constituted 
“real” torture, the president as commander in chief had the constitutional 
prerogative to ignore any laws, domestic or foreign, that impeded achieving 
                                                                                                                             
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 70–80. Posner suggests 
that “homogeneity of outlook and of values [is] the real motor of” of an 
ostensible consensus that provides the “comfortable illusion of analytical 
rigor” that undergirds the notion of legal craft. Ibid., 76. As one of us has 
pointed out, Posner has adopted a skepticism toward law in some respects 
indistinguishable from critical legal studies, but without its leftist or 
egalitarian politics. See Sanford Levinson, “Strolling down the Path of the 
Law (and toward Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard 
Posner,” Columbia Law Review 91 (1991): 1221–52. In fact, Posner may be 
far more disdainful of the rule of law than Horwitz, first, because of his 
jurisprudential theory, which celebrates an unabashed “pragmatism,” and, 
second, because of his willingness to discard or balance away procedural 
protections and substantive rights to conduct the war on terror. See Richard 
Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2008); Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National 
Emergency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Indeed, to the extent 
that Posner’s arguments for loosening civil liberties protections or even 
authorizing torture are based on the judgments of experts about what 
necessity requires, we might compare him to James Landis in his most 
ebullient period, while Horwitz might find himself far more comfortable 
with Roscoe Pound’s criticisms of rule by experts. 
77 See in particular Michael Stokes Paulsen, “The Constitution of Necessity,” 
Notre Dame Law Review 79 (2005): 1257–98.  
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victory. If the Bush administration violated the rule of law, it did not violate 
the rule of lawyers. 
In each of these cases, opponents nevertheless insisted that the Bush 
administration had violated the rule of law and the values of legality. But 
that accusation, even if accepted, does not begin to describe the problem that 
a scholar like Horwitz faced in contrast, say, to Georgetown law professor 
Martin Lederman, a former lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel who takes 
the duty of fidelity to law with the utmost seriousness and a complete lack of 
cynicism. For someone like Horwitz, the problem ran far deeper: it was that 
the Bush administration had co-opted the progressive vision of law itself—
not to mention the importance of strong and energetic executive leadership. 
It was, after all, Teddy Roosevelt who championed the “stewardship” theory 
of presidential leadership; Frankfurter had championed Roosevelt’s Bull 
Moose campaign and, of course, had been a notable contributor to Herbert 
Croly’s New Republic. And it was Croly who touted the rise of Roosevelt as 
a release from the narrow-mindedness of “government by lawyers” and an 
acknowledgment “that the national principle involve[s] a continual process 
of internal reformation.”78 In an extremely interesting recent essay on the 
rise of the presidency as the locus of transformative power, Yale political 
scientist Stephen Skowronek quotes the late nineteenth-century historian 
Henry Jones Ford, who wrote that the work of the presidency was “the work 
of the people breaking through the constitutional form.”79 There was, of 
course, no guarantee that such an exuberant notion of presidential power 
would not be turned to decidedly non-progressive ends.  
If law is properly considered a flexible instrument of social policy, 
why should the law not bend when faced with an emergency? Wasn’t this 
                                                 
78 See Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (1909; Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 136, 168. See generally Stephen Skowronek, “The 
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the all-important lesson taught by a canonical New Deal case, Home Savings 
and Loan v. Blaisdell?80 If one takes seriously the contemporary mantras of 
“text” and “history,” then it is difficult indeed to justify the “mortgage 
moratorium” passed by the Minnesota legislature against the firm command 
of Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution that states shall pass no laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts. In Blaisdell, Chief Justice Hughes 
offered a notable defense of a “living Constitution,” downplaying the 
requirements of textual formalism and fidelity to original intent, given the 
emergency and challenge to America posed by the Great Depression.  
Moreover, if one should constantly reinterpret law so as to safeguard 
important values, why are security and safety not the most important values 
of all? This, of course, was the message Franklin Roosevelt conveyed in his 
egregious Order 9066 placing Japanese resident aliens and even Japanese 
American citizens in what Justice Owen Roberts labeled “concentration 
camps.” Consider also Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s defense of Lincoln and 
Roosevelt as war leaders who routinely bent legal rules to serve the national 
interest.81 “These two Presidents,” Schlesinger writes, “remained faithful to 
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution: acting on the spirit to save the 
letter.”82 
The problem of the early twenty-first century is not that the Bush 
administration merely flouted the rule of law, but that it did so in the name 
of a twisted version of the progressive vision of legal flexibility and 
adaptability that, in at least some of its instantiations, Horwitz admired 
greatly. There was no one so adaptable in their usages of law, one might 
think, as John Yoo and David Addington. Each could have quoted John 
Marshall on the necessity to “adapt” the Constitution to the “great crises of 
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human affairs”83 and, had they wished, cited at least some decisions of the 
New Deal and post–New Deal eras as offering models of just such 
adaptation. Together, Yoo and Addington collapsed the very distinctions that 
Horwitz had objected to in his critique of Thompson: “law from politics, 
means from ends, processes from outcomes.” This was a dark parody of the 
progressive vision of law that Horwitz celebrated in his books. 
The events of the early twenty-first century offer a complicated 
lesson. On the one hand, they show why the values behind the rule of law 
are as important as ever to restrain arbitrary power and violations of human 
dignity, especially when that power is disguised through the forms and 
practices of legal reasoning. On the other, they seem to show that mere 
adherence to legal formalities and the discourse of professional legal culture 
may not prevent arbitrariness, seizures of power, violations of human 
dignity, brutality, or even torture. Legal formality, or, we might say, 
adherence to legal “grammar,” is not the same thing as respect for the rule of 
law, except by stipulative definition. The rule of law, rather, seems to be a 
vague and abstract political value that seeks to restrain arbitrariness 
(however defined) and promote human dignity (again however defined) 
through a set of regular legal procedures that limit discretion and require 
reasoned justification. These political values may not be respected even if 
the forms of legal discourse are respected. 
Nevertheless, this account of the rule of law as a political value that 
transcends legal grammar and legal practice might still not be enough for 
Horwitz. Rather, what we see in Transformation and in the Warren Court 
book is something different: a progressive vision of law that argues that law 
should flexibly serve moral progress and should always be grounded in just 
values. If law is not in the service of these ends, it is not a human good; or 
perhaps more correctly, because it so often does not serve these values, it 
cannot be an unqualified human good. 
This answer, however, brings us back to Hobbes and the need to 
maintain order in a world of moral disagreement. The difficulty with the 
progressive vision that law should be applied flexibly to serve what is just 
and good is that people disagree—often violently—about these values; they 
also disagree about who is really oppressed and treated unjustly, even about 
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who is really an outsider and who is elite or privileged. In the era of 
globalization, these differences of opinion appear ever more ominous. But 
even among our fellow countrymen, moral dissensus abounds. Horwitz, no 
doubt, has watched with rueful amusement as the conservative movements 
of the past two decades have eagerly adopted the language of dispossession, 
anti-hierarchy, and victimization traditionally associated with the egalitarian 
Left. A Marxist theory of history might purport to explain who is really 
history’s underdog and who is merely an opportunistic poseur. But in a post-
Marxist era where interest groups, ethnicities, and religions vie for the title 
of who has been treated the most unjustly and who is least privileged, 
grievances and claims of oppression seem to emanate from all directions. 
The one constant appears to be the steady accumulation of more power by 
governments claiming to act in the name of the people and to keep them safe 
from unspecified harms of unspecified duration. In this world the political 
values of the rule of law might yet have some purchase, whether the goods 
they offer are qualified or not. The challenge for contemporary legal 
scholarship—which has inherited a deeply instrumental conception of 
law84—is whether we can find an adequate language to synthesize that 
realist and critical conception with the affirmative political values of the rule 
of law. Morton Horwitz’s struggles with the rule of law are also our own. 
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